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Reaching out to the poor and the informal sector is a major challenge for achieving universal coverage in
lesser-developed countries. In Cambodia, extensive coverage by health equity funds for the poor has
created the opportunity to consolidate various non-government health ﬁnancing schemes under the
government’s proposed social health protection structure. This paper identiﬁes the main policy and
operational challenges to strengthening existing arrangements for the poor and the informal sector, and
considers policy options to address these barriers. Conducted in conjunction with the Cambodian
Ministry of Health in 2011e12, the study reviewed policy documents and collected qualitative data
through 18 semi-structured key informant interviews with government, non-government and donor
ofﬁcials. Data were analysed using the Organizational Assessment for Improving and Strengthening
Health Financing conceptual framework. We found that a signiﬁcant shortfall related to institutional,
organisational and health ﬁnancing issues resulted in fragmentation and constrained the implementa-
tion of social health protection schemes, including health equity funds, community-based health in-
surance, vouchers and others. Key documents proposed the establishment of a national structure for the
uniﬁcation of the informal-sector schemes but left unresolved issues related to structure, institutional
capacity and the third-party status of the national agency. This study adds to the evidence base on
appropriate and effective institutional and organizational arrangements for social health protection in
the informal sector in developing countries. Among the key lessons are: the need to expand the ﬁscal
space for health care; a commitment to equity; speciﬁc measures to protect the poor; building national
capacity for administration of universal coverage; and working within the speciﬁc national context.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
All countries regardless of income level can set out on the path
to universal coverage (UC) through a mix of different pre-payment
and risk-pooling mechanisms, using a combination of tax-funding
and social health insurance (SHI) (Antunes & Saksena, 2009;
Carrin & James, 2004; Chan, 2010; Evans & Etienne, 2010; OECD,þ61 410 561 189 (mobile);
(P.L. Annear), shakila@
om.kh (C.E. Ros), irpor@
.
).
Y-NC-ND license.2009). While achieving UC in lesser-developed countries (LDCs)
may be more difﬁcult, many countries that recently moved to
UC began the process when they were at an earlier stage of eco-
nomic development (Mills, 2007; Tangcharoensathien, Prakongsai,
Limwattananon, Patcharanarumol, & Jongudomsuk, 2007). There is,
however, a gap in country-level evidence and understanding of the
institutional and organizational arrangements that are needed in
LDCs during the transition to UC (Carrin, Mathauer, Xu, & Evans,
2008).
Generally, in LDCs the income tax base is narrow, even where
economic growth is strong, and revenue collection for social health
protection (SHP) is constrained (Carrin, Waelkens, & Criel, 2005).
The formal employment sector (government and private enter-
prise) is small, populations are overwhelmingly rural, the informal
sector (self-employed and subsistence) typically comprises more
than half the population and poverty is extensive. Nominally ‘free’
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barriers to accessing these services), and poorer households are
often unable to meet the costs of health insurance premiums
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011).
Consequently, universal coverage schemes that focus primarily
on the formal sector through compulsory insurance, without tar-
geted schemes for the poor, risk creating a health ﬁnancing system
that is more inequitable (Gwatkin & Ergo, 2011; WHO, 2008).
Allotey, Verghis, Alvarez-Castillo, and Reidpath (2012) and Allotey,
Yasin et al. (2012) argue that to be truly universal, coverage must be
extended to all population groups regardless of individual eco-
nomic, social or geographic position. However, expanding the risk
pool for voluntary and community-based insurance schemes in the
informal sector faces signiﬁcant cultural and economic constraints
(Chankova, Sulzbach, & Diop, 2008;Mills, 2007; Nguyen & Knowles,
2010; Pauly, Blavin, & Meghan, 2008; Poletti et al., 2007; Thornton
et al., 2010). Generally, the poor and the informal sector have low,
irregular, non-taxed incomes, are dispersed geographically, and
may be difﬁcult to identify as beneﬁciaries (Canagarajah &
Setharaman, 2001).
What then are the institutional, organisational and health
ﬁnancing arrangements required to provide social health protec-
tion for the poor and the informal sector? And to what extent are
LDC governments ready to meet these challenges? In practice,
broad and inclusive approaches are needed along with targeted
schemes for hard to reach population groups, including measures
such as direct subsidies (health equity funds, vouchers, cash
transfers), voluntary afﬁliation to formal-sector national insurance
schemes, public subsidies to enrol the poor or informal workers, or
mandatory participation (Ahmed & Khan, 2011; Ekman, Nguyen,
Ha, & Axelson, 2008; Gottret & Schieber, 2006; Ir, Heang, & Sim,
2010; Ir, Horemans, Souk, & Van Damme, 2010; Mathauer,
Schmidt, & Wenyaa, 2008; Morris, Flores, Olinto, & Medina, 2004).
One consequence of implementing targeted schemes within a
multiplicity of SHP arrangements is fragmentation of administra-
tion and funding (Carrin et al., 2008; Li, Yu, Butler, Yiengprugsawan,
& Yu, 2011; McIntyre et al., 2008; WHO, 2005). Creating uniform
and effective systems therefore depends on effective planning and
maintaining a balance of power among health-system stakeholders
(El-Idrissi, Miloud, & Belgacem, 2008). The need for government
intervention in addition to social-health or other insurance market
arrangements has been recognised (Allotey, Yasin et al., 2012; Chua
& Chee, 2012; Mathauer, Cavagnero, Vivas, & Carrin, 2010). The
challenge is to develop regulatory and ﬁnancing mechanisms by
engaging with the political process, build government adminis-
trative and technical capacity, include all stakeholders with cross-
sectoral coordination and recognise patient views of quality and
accessibility (Allotey, Verghis et al., 2012).
Social health protection in Cambodia
In Cambodia, out-of-pocket spending is almost two-thirds of
total health expenditure; more than one-quarter of the population
live below the poverty line and are, by deﬁnition, unable to pay for
health care, and debt for health care is known to be amajor cause of
impoverishment (Van Damme, van Leemput, Ir, Hardeman, &
Meessen, 2004). Removing ﬁnancial barriers at the point of care
and developing SHP mechanisms is a key Ministry of Health (MOH)
objective (MOH, 2008a). There are currently a number of different
SHP schemes for the poor and the informal sector, including user-
fee exemptions, Health Equity Funds (HEFs), a Government Sub-
sidy Scheme (SUBO), Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI),
targeted vouchers and conditional cash transfers (CCT) (Annear,
Bigdeli, & Jacobs, 2011; Ir, Heang et al., 2010; Ir, Horemans et al.,
2010; Jacobs et al., 2008; Jacobs, Price, & Sam, 2007; Saneth et al.,2010). The main features of these schemes are summarised in
Table 1.
Targeted on the poor, Health Equity Funds are the country’s
major social protection mechanism (Annear, 2008; Annear, Bigdeli,
Ros, & Jacobs, 2008). Cambodia was the ﬁrst country to introduce
HEFs, beginning in 2000, as a third-party payer for services at
public health facilities. Until now, each HEF has been managed at
district level by a local agent (commonly a local NGO; known as the
HEF operator) and supervised at the national level by an interna-
tional NGO (known as the HEF implementer). HEFs are ﬁnanced
mainly by donor and government counterpart funds through the
national MOH-donor Health Sector Support Project (HSSP) (CARD,
2010). The aim is soon to achieve national coverage (MOH,
2008b). By 2012, HEFs and SUBOs together provided protection
for the poor in 56 of a total 77 health operational districts (ODs),
covering at least 78% of the population living below the poverty
line, or 3.2 million people (Flores, Ir, Men, O’Donnell, & van
Doorslaer, 2011; Health Messenger, 2011; Men, Ir, Annear, & Sour,
2011; MOH, 2011; Ros, 2011). Using a national proxy means test
now administered by the Ministry of Planning (MOP), the beneﬁ-
ciary pre-identiﬁcation system has been shown to be accurate at
the time of survey, though changes in socio-economic status over
time and the difﬁculty in reaching migrant workers and those
whose work requires mobility introduces an element of inclusion
and exclusion error (Ir, 2009; Ir, Heang et al., 2010; Ir, Kristof,
Hardeman, Horemans, & Van Damme, 2008). The evidence that
HEFs, CBHI and other demand-side schemes increase ﬁnancial ac-
cess to services for the poor and the near poor, reduce health costs
and minimize impoverishment to households and reduce out of
pocket health expenditures is well documented elsewhere (Annear,
2010; Flores et al., 2011; Hardeman et al., 2004; Ir, Horemans et al.,
2010; Noirhomme et al., 2007).
The current operation of these schemes by government,
different donors and various international and local NGOs has
resulted in a fragmented administrative systemwith high overhead
costs (Crossland & Conway, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2007; MOH, 2009),
high monitoring and evaluation costs and complex reporting re-
quirements. Fragmentation has complicated the stewardship
functions of the MOH, stretches the capacity of the MOH to coor-
dinate and support the different arrangements and undermines the
ﬁnancial sustainability of the schemes (Jacobs & Price, 2006; Jacobs
et al., 2007).
These longer-term developments in the Cambodia health sector
have laid the foundation for the current process aimed at defrag-
mentation. These circumstances are discussed further below, but
include increased government funding in the health sector, further
alignment of donors with national priorities, an ongoing concern
among policy makers with health equity, and in particular the
expansion of HEFs to national coverage (Martinez et al., 2011; Men
et al., 2011; MOH, 2011).
Methods
This article investigates the main policy and operational barriers
to, and opportunities for, creating a national SHP agency for the
poor and the informal sector. While the paper analyses policy
challenges rather than the process of making policy, we draw on
the approach developed by Walt and Gilson and the broader
tradition of policy analysis (Gilson, 2012; Gilson & Raphaely, 2008;
Walt & Gilson, 1994; Walt et al., 2008). We focus on the Cambodian
context and look particularly at the approach taken by key policy
making actors, including the views of scholars, politicians, bu-
reaucrats and other prominent ﬁgures (Kingdon, 1984). The re-
searchers themselves have an advantaged position as long-term
observers of health policy development in Cambodia. Our vantage
Table 1
Overview of social health protection schemes in Cambodia.
Scheme Implementer/Operator Target group Beneﬁt/Service Coverage/Location
Government service provision:
Tax funding via
Government budget
MEF/MOH/PHD/OD/RH/HC All population sectors Recurrent budget, drugs and
material supplies
Nationwide public health
facilities
Compulsory, formal-sector schemes:
Social Health Insurance NSSF/MOLVT Formal sector workers
(est. 1.2 million workers
out of total 7 million
workforce)
Currently only occupational risk;
user fees, transport, disability
beneﬁt, funeral expenses and
survivor beneﬁt; proposed
medical coverage not yet begun
In 3 national hospitals and
12 referral hospitals in 7
provinces, covering approx.
40% of formal sector workers;
a pilot for formal sector workers
is being tested in Phnom Penh
Social Health Insurance NCSSF/MOSVY Civil servants Still to be deﬁned A pilot for formal sector workers
is being tested in Phnom Penh
Occupational risk
insurance
NSSF/MOLVT Formal private sector
workers
Medical treatment, temporary/
permanent disable, funeral
expenses and survivor beneﬁt
Covered 2429 enterprises (88%
of enterprises) with 591,955
workers
Maternity beneﬁts NSSF/MOLVT
NCSSF/MOSVY
Pregnant women formal
sector workers and civil
servants (spouses)
3 month maternity leave with
50% salary for workers. For civil
servants, 3 month maternity leave
with full salary and cash incentive
of USD150 per newborn
National coverage
Demand-side schemes for the informal sector and the poor:
Global health initiatives
and vertical programs
National programs Patients with TB, malaria,
AIDS, and children for
vaccination,
Medicines and vaccines Public facilities nationwide
User feea exemptions MOH/health facilities Poor patients User fee schedule Public facilities nationwide
Health Equity Funds NGOs for the formal HEFs The eligible poor (those
under the national poverty
line; est. 4 m pop.)
User fees, food, transport
Limited funeral expenses and
other basic items
In 56 Referral hospitals and
361 health centres, covering
approx. 78% of the target
group or 3.2 m people
Government Subsidy
schemes (SUBO)
MOH/PHD/OD The eligible poor (those
under the national
poverty line)
User fees In 6 National Hospitals, 10
referral hospitals and 89
health centres
Community-Based
Health Insurance
Mainly NGOs Mainly informal sector
people living above
poverty line
User fees
Limited food and transport,
funeral cost
18 schemes in 16 hospitals
and 164 health centres,
covering 237,000 persons
or approx. 1.6% of the
population
Vouchers MOH/NGOs Poor pregnant women User fees and transport for 3
ANCs, delivery and PNC at
health centres
In 5 ODs with 5 hospitals
and 78 health centres
a User fees do not provide for full cost recovery but are set according to affordability by the majority of people, in principle with the involvement and support of the
community and local authorities before approval by the MOH. User-fee exemptions are poorly administered and largely ineffective. Source: updated from Saneth et al. (2010).
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two of four recognised stages of policy development (including also
implementation and evaluation).
The ﬁndings are based on a review of policy documents and on
qualitative data collected through key informant interviews carried
out in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, during 2011e12. The identiﬁcation
and selection of documents was based on the extensive experience
of the key authors and on previous reviews (see Annear, 2010). We
searched the published and grey literature by themes related to
social health protection for supplementary and current titles. We
included all relevant reports and publications from other minis-
tries, development partners and NGOs, and selected all documents
that speciﬁcally proposed institutional and organizational ar-
rangements for social health protection. These documents were
sourced directly from the MOH, development partners and NGOs,
veriﬁed during the interview process, and are listed in Table 2
below. Following accepted principles of qualitative analysis, the
documents were reviewed against a prepared list of topics to
determine the level and nature of support for establishing a na-
tional agency, to understand the most common constraints and to
identify possible options for policy development.
We conducted key informant interviews to examine the views
and values of policy makers and technical advisors about the issuesraised in policy documents and outstanding questions (Antunes,
Wanert, Bigdel, & Ros, 2009; Brenzel et al., 2009). Respondents
were identiﬁed during preliminary investigations and purposively
selected as the most important national and international technical
staff working with the government at national level on scheme
implementation and/or policy development covering the institu-
tional and organisational arrangements for social health protection.
We included all key technical staff involved centrally in policy
making and available for interview; there were no exclusions for
any reason.We did not interview respondents involved primarily in
political decision-making because the discussion had not yet
moved from the technical level into that arena.
A total of 18 key informants comprising 10 national policy
makers, four representatives of development partner organisations
and four program managers were selected, including: (i) national
policy makers at the MOH, the Ministry of Economics and Finance,
the Council for Agriculture and Rural Development and the Council
for Administrative Reform; (ii) technical advisors working with
development partners; and (iii) scheme implementers and opera-
tors. Technical experts, civil society, academicians and politicians
all have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on health policy and each seeks to
preserve their constituency interests (Seddoh et al., 2012). Beneﬁ-
ciaries in this study were represented by the HEF and CBHI
Table 2
Major policy documents and reviews.
Document title Authors Published by Source
Ofﬁcial documents:
Health Strategic Plan 2008e2015 MOH, 2008b Ministry of Health, Royal Government
of Cambodia
http://www.moh.gov.kh/ﬁles/dphi/HSP0815En.pdf
Strategic Framework for
Health Financing 2008e2015
MOH, 2008a Ministry of Health: Department of
Planning and Health Information
http://www.moh.gov.kh
Implementation of Health
Equity Funds (and Government
Subsidy Scheme) Guideline
MOH, 2009 Ministry of Health, Royal
Government of Cambodia
http://www.moh.gov.kh/ﬁles/hssp2/heﬁm/HEF%20Implementation%20Gudelines-Eng.pdf
Draft Master Plan on Social Health
Protection
Kingdom of
Cambodia, 2009
Prepared by the Ministry of Health http://www.medicam-cambodia.org/publication/details.asp?publication_id¼19&pub_language¼English
National Social Protection Strategy
for the Poor and Vulnerable
CARD, 2010 Council for Agricultural and Rural
Development
http://www.medicam-cambodia.org/publication/download.asp?publication_id¼55&pub_language¼English
Health Financing Policy MOH, 2012 Ministry of Health pannear@unimelb.edu.au
Reviews and evaluations:
Review of mechanisms to improve
equity in access to health care,
Cambodia
Crossland &
Conway, 2002
DFID Health Systems Resource
Centre: London
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id¼3455&title¼pro-poor-health-ﬁnancing-equity-funds-cambodia
Summary Report of the Health
Financing System Assessment
in Cambodia (OASIS)
Antunes et al., 2009 Korean Foundation for International
Healthcare and the Providing for
Health Initiative
http://www.who.int/health_ﬁnancing/documents/cov-oasis_e_09-cambodia/en/index.html
Evaluation of subsidy schemes
under Prakas 809 to support
the Ministry of Health of
Cambodia to achieve universal
social health protection coverage
Men et al., 2011 Belgian Technical Cooperation and
the Ministry of Health: Phnom Penh
pannear@unimelb.edu.au
Overall assessment for mid-term
review of the Health Strategic
Plan 2008e2015.
Martinez, Simmonds,
Vinyals, Hun, Phally
and Ir, 2011
HLSP: Phnom Penh, AugusteNovember
2011
pannear@unimelb.edu.au
Synthesis assessment of medium-term
issues and options for supply and
demand side-initiatives for improving
quality and access to health services,
supported under HSSP2 (Draft Report)
MOH & World
Bank, 2011
Royal Government of Cambodia,
Ministry of Health
pannear@unimelb.edu.au
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data, we are conﬁdent this does not affect our analysis regarding
the institutional and organizational structures proposed for social
health protection.
All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Cambodia in En-
glish by the authors in September 2011 using a semi-structured
questionnaire. Key informants were guaranteed anonymity to
encourage an open expression of their views. Interview responses
were written by hand as previous experience tells us that by using
electronically recorded interviews in the Cambodian cultural
environment it is unlikely we would have heard frank and open
views from policy makers and ofﬁcials about contentious policy
issues. The key informants were asked questions speciﬁcally on
institutional design, the proposed location of a national agency, the
institutional and organizational structure, its mandate and re-
sponsibilities, institutional and human resources capacity devel-
opment, management information systems and procedures for
ﬁnancial management and accountability. As the interviews and
wider research were carried out with informants in their profes-
sional capacity on behalf and with the approval of the Ministry of
Health, Cambodia, it was considered that formal ethics approval
was not required.
Building on the work by Carrin and James (2004) and Mills
(2007), we analysed the data using the Organizational Assess-
ment for Improving and Strengthening Health Financing (OASIS)
conceptual framework proposed by Mathauer and Carrin (2010,
2011). We based our work also on an earlier OASIS analysis of
SHP strategies in Cambodia by Antunes et al. (2009). The frame-
work identiﬁes stewardship functions related to resource collec-
tion, fund pooling and service provision at two levels: (i)
institutional design and organisation practice; (ii) nine key health
ﬁnancing indicators. The Framework also identiﬁes six potential
bottlenecks in policy development and three feasibility conditions,
which provide the basis for the Discussion section below.
Findings
In this section, we analyse institutional design and organiza-
tional practice issues under the three health ﬁnancing functions
(collection, pooling and purchasing), consider the impact on health
ﬁnancing indicators and identify apparent bottlenecks.
Design features
A common understanding among key informants was the need
for legal authorisation (a government decree), an independent
board and terms of reference for a SHP agency. During 2012, a new
Health Financing Policy was drafted by the MOH with the partici-
pation of many of the policy makers interviewed for this research
(MOH, 2012). The Policy proposed the establishment of a single
National Social Health Protection Fund (NSHPF) to unify all schemes
for the poor and the informal sector. The NSHPF is to be a semi-
autonomous body under the MOH, though the rules and regula-
tions for the Fund are yet to be deﬁned. From the institutional
perspective, a new Health Financing Charter, which will detail the
rules and regulations for implementation of health ﬁnancing and
social health protection arrangements, is due for release in 2013.
The draft Policy builds on previous documents and reﬂects the
proposition offered, for example, in the Synthesis Assessment of
Supply- and Demand-Side Initiatives, where the MOH and World
Bank saw the highest priority as establishing a national fund to
implement HEFs and CBHI schemes. The draft Master Plan on Social
Health Protection (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2009) recognises the
need for a single common framework to facilitate themove towards
universal coverage, but as one key informant argued, “we don’tneed to wait for a long-term arrangement for all insurance schemes
at this stage; we should go ahead for the [poor and the] informal
sector” (Key informant #11). The aim, said one key informant, “is
not to centralise management power to any single institution, but
[to implement] a multi-sectoral approach within a common stra-
tegic framework” (Key informant #4). Another recognised the
constraints:
Implementation of the Master Plan is not easy and may not be
feasible in the short run. We must go step by step, and we know in
other countries this process takes a very long time (Key informant
#18).
Collection of funds
The proposed NSHPF will be tax-funded (with donor support),
with subsidies to enrol all of the poor and the informal sector
population. The Health Strategic Plan 2008e15 earlier proposed a
‘mixed model’ of health ﬁnancing that combines public and private
revenue collection and service delivery together with fee-based
prepayment and social-transfer mechanisms; it called for an
increased health budget and the alignment of donor funding with
MOH strategies. The Strategic Framework for Health Financing
focused on strengthening government funding (Strategic Objective
1) and on reinforcing interim measures to protect households
(Strategic Objective 3).
There are several challenges to organizational practice. Some
respondents preferred to place an SHP agency under the Council of
the Ministers (COMethe executive body of the government) rather
than the MOH to avoid an appearance of conﬂict of interest. Both
insufﬁcient funding from government sources and limited imple-
mentation capacity were considered major challenges in trans-
ferring responsibility for HEF and CBHI administration from the
current NGO implementers (Key informant #10).
The MOH does not have sufﬁcient capacity to implement and
monitor the activities of a national HEF-CBHI agency; the MOHwill
need enough human capacity and other resources (Key informant
#16).
Another concern was the lack of “a common national moni-
toring and evaluation framework for SHP schemes” (Key informant
#1), which reﬂected the lack of a central data management system
or adequate systems within ministries.Pooling of funds
The Health Financing Policy supports the idea that common
risk- and fund-pooling can be attained for various population
groups under the NSHPF in order to address fragmentation. Key
informants conﬁrmed that “most of the donors are willing to pro-
vide funds to a common pool” (Key informant #5), although:
Sometimes donors are not on the same ground, and disagreements
are found among them [and they] may not agree on common
funding arrangements. Therefore, donors have to. be assured that
proper use of funds will be monitored effectively (Key informant
#14).
More immediately, the Overall Assessment for Mid-Term Re-
view of Health Strategic Plan recommended scaling-up HEFs to
cover the poor population nationally, increasing government
funding to HEFs and transferring national HEF management and
funding functions to a government-led institution.
Organizationally, the Health Financing Policy proposes that both
the poor and the informal sector will be automatically enrolled
with the proposed NSHPF, which could address the concern that
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mium for CBHI due to their irregular income; they easily drop out
from the scheme” (Key informant #6). Even though “identiﬁcation
of the poor to receive free services and subsidies remains prob-
lematic and challenging” (Key informant #4), key informants sug-
gested it nonetheless could be extended to the non-poor informal
sector.Purchasing of services
The Health Financing Policy proposes that health services be
purchased from accredited health providers by the MOH and the
three SHP agencies (civil servants, formal sector, informal sector/
poor), which together will deﬁne the content of the essential social
and medical beneﬁt package and provider payment systems. Ser-
vices will be purchased from the pooled funds, with regulations
and incentives to guarantee quality of care. Donors and imple-
menters strongly supported the need for third-party status as a
purchaser of health services from government facilities; others
were less convinced:
The national agency must consider third-party arrangements in
implementation; these would facilitate smooth implementation
and monitoring (Key informant #17).
I am not sure whether we need an autonomous HEF agency; from a
SHP perspective, there is no need for the MOH to create an
autonomous agency (Key informant #8).
The agency at the beginning could be located at the MOH and later
could be converted to an independent agency attached to the MOH
(Key informant #16).
Revenues earned from user fees, HEFs and CBHI schemes have
been an important source of incentives for health facility staff and a
mechanism for enforcing quality standards at contracted facilities.
These procedures provide a foundation for new organizational ar-
rangements in a uniﬁed fund together with administrative efﬁ-
ciency, avoiding duplication and implementing accountability
mechanisms.Health ﬁnancing indicators
Policy documents and key informants anticipate that the move
to a national agency for the poor and informal sector would have
positive effects on key health ﬁnancing indicators:
 Funding: Themove towards uniﬁcation of various SHP schemes
under national administration has been made possible by sig-
niﬁcant increases in the health budget. During a period of
strong economic growth, the annual budget allocation to
health increased by 23% in 2008e2009 and a further 16% in
2009e2010 (MOH, 2011).
 Population coverage: With 25% coverage of the total popula-
tion, the HEFs provide a strong foundation for the proposed
NSHPF; supported by automatic enrolment for the informal
sector, up to 80% of the population will be protected.
 Equity in ﬁnancing: Has been achieved through the HEFs, with
proposed expansion to the informal sector; the MOH’s long
standing commitment to health equity (MOH, 2008a, 2008b,
2009, 2012) reﬂects a recognition within government of the
political need to provide for rural communities in the wake of
the Khmer Rouge tragedy of the 1970s.
 Financial risk protection: It has been shown that HEFs reduce
out-of-pocket health expenditure by beneﬁciaries by an
average 29% per household and debt by 25% (Flores et al., 2011)and, where it is available, CBHI reduces the cost of health
shocks by 40% and household health-related debt by 75%
(Levine, Polimeni, & Ramage, 2011).
 Pooling: Since the mid-1990s, the MOH has worked to create a
common platform with development partners through
monthly Technical Working Group meetings and under pooled
donor-government funding arrangements known as a SWiM
(Sector-Wide Management) approach.
 Administrative efﬁciency: While administration costs for HEFs
are only 13% of total expenditures (MOH, 2011), CBHI costs are
higher due to low membership ﬁgures; it was argued that
achieving “administrative efﬁciency will depend on the [pre-
cise] role of the autonomous agency; the current administra-
tion of HEF and CBHI schemes through international and
national NGOs is expensive, and transaction costs are high .
[and] we must minimise these costs” (Key informant #16).
 Beneﬁt package: Subsidised by government through provision
of drugs and medical products (72% of government health
expenditure) and salaries (6% of government health expendi-
ture) (MOH, 2012); HEFs and CBHI currently reimburse user
fees for access to a common standard package of services at
health facilities and hospitals. The Master Plan anticipates that
a single national agency would allow for portability between
schemes and proposes an expanded beneﬁt package (to
include reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health and
non-communicable diseases). A concern was how to tailor an
appropriate beneﬁt package that would support the growth of
membership but remain affordable:
Current beneﬁt packages can be reviewed and based on a mini-
mum package that can be introduced at the beginning. The second
option could be a comprehensive beneﬁt package, according to the
availability of funding and services at the different levels (Key
informant #15).Institutional and organizational bottlenecks
In the new round of policy development that commenced in
Cambodia in 2012, health policy makers confront a range of insti-
tutional and organizational bottlenecks affecting further progress
towards UC (Mathauer & Carrin, 2011). There is no governing
legislation for social health protection, and the Master Plan is still
under consideration by the government. At the centre of the policy
debate is the third-party status of any agency that may emerge to
cover the poor and the informal sector.
A number of conﬂicting rules or unresolved issues are evident.
Ofﬁcial documents leave open the possibility of creating a single
umbrella agency for all SHP schemes or moving ﬁrst to create a
separate structure for the informal sector and the poor alongside
the existing national social security funds for civil servants and
private employees. The documents also leave open the possibility
that a national administration of the demand-side schemes (prin-
cipally HEF and CBHI) could be placed under a semi-autonomous
agency reporting to the MOH or in a completely autonomous
structure. One key informant expressed awidely held view that any
agency within the MOH would face a conﬂict of interest between
service provision and provider payment.
The enforcement of existing rules is in some cases incomplete.
While MOH guidelines govern the implementation of HEF and CBHI
schemes, newer schemes such as vouchers or CCTs lie outside the
guidelines. At the same time, the HEF and CBHI implementers and
operators have an independent responsibility to implement the
schemes efﬁciently and effectively. There is considerable variation
in contracting arrangements, fee schedules and provider payment
systems. Procedures for monitoring HEF and CBHI implementation
P.L. Annear et al. / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 223e231 229are in place, but, as one key informant observed, the MOH has had
little capacity to implement monitoring or to follow up on the
results.
Discussion and conclusions
In Cambodia as elsewhere, social health insurance initiatives
commonly form one part of a broader health sector reform aimed at
improving equity and sustainability (McIntyre, Doherty, & Gilson,
2003). Health policy makers in Cambodia have looked for ways to
address a series of challenges: How to use the administrative and
ﬁnancial base created by the HEFs (the biggest single social pro-
tection scheme in the country) to expand coverage into the
informal sector; how to transfer the responsibilities for HEF
governance and management from development-partners to full
government authority; and how to develop the institutional rules
and organizational structures required for a national UC system.
The case of Cambodia suggests that establishing the most effective
institutional and organizational structures needed to cover the
poor and the informal sector depends as much on context and ca-
pacity as on identifying appropriate health ﬁnancing settings.
Our study reinforces the understanding that deﬁning the most
appropriate settings for the health ﬁnancing functions (collecting,
pooling and purchasing) is essential. It is known that pro-poor
strategies may be either successful in achieving greater equity, as
in Thailand (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien, & et al, 2012), or
may have unintended effects, as in Uganda (Nabyonga Orem &
Muheki Zikusooka, 2010; Nabyonga Orem et al., 2012). Targeting
of SHP schemes on different segments of the population is a com-
mon approach in low- and middle-income countries, such as
Thailand (; Mills, 2007; Tangcharoensathien et al., 2011). While
appropriate at early stages of development, the approach runs the
risk of fragmenting risk pools and organizational structures, which
may be ameliorated where risk-equalization methods of some sort
are in place (Carrin & James, 2004). In Thailand, rapid progress was
madewhen the government chose (for political reasons perhaps) to
extend free-access to the informal sector, underpinned by many
years of experimentation led by public health ofﬁcials (Mills, 2007;
Nitayarumphong, 2006). In Cambodia, risk equalisation for the poor
has been achieved through the subsidised HEFs, which pool funds
ﬁnanced by transfers from taxation and donor funding.
The governance function provides the point of origin for the
OASIS framework, and in practice is reinforced by challenges facing
countries like Cambodia. As Carrin et al. (2004) have noted, frag-
mentation in the administration of different schemes raises the
need for a stronger stewardship role. Experience shows that
effective regulation and strong government intervention to allocate
health investment are required for achieving UC (Allotey, Verghis
et al., 2012; Allotey, Yasin et al., 2012). The challenge is to incor-
porate the complex interrelations of health system components
and the numerous contextual factors that may inﬂuence the
effectiveness of interventions, particularly their effects on disad-
vantaged populations (Bosch-Capblanch et al., 2012). Understand-
ably, as Kutzin (2008) notes, outcomes will depend on the national
priority given to the health sector.
The Cambodian MOH, together with development partners, has
taken a leading role in selecting an appropriate mix of regulatory
and ﬁnancing mechanisms. Increasing funding and building ca-
pacity for implementation of SHP schemes within the government
structure are the twomain challenges. Capacity building for change
management, human resources, administration and monitoring
will be needed at provincial and district as well as national levels
(Antunes et al., 2009). Taking into account the population view of
the quality, accessibility, value and appropriateness of health ser-
vices is an additional challenge. Good governance is thereforecritical in achieving efﬁciency and developing the technical and
administrative capacity of public institutions and civil servants
(Allotey, Verghis et al., 2012; Allotey, Yasin et al., 2012). From a
political point of view, the government’s commitments to
advancing social protection makes reforms within the health sector
timely, politically feasible and desirable (according to measures
suggested by Oliver & Mossialos (2005).
Cambodia is one of many LDCs taking the initial steps on the
pathway to UC, where the poor are a large proportion of the popu-
lation and capacity for implementation of UC is yet to be developed.
A system that depends mainly on mandatory insurance is likely to
achieve a lower degree of equity in ﬁnancing than one based on
general tax revenue, as in Thailand for example (Mills, 2007). Health
Equity Funds offer a promising approach (Hanson, Worrall, &
Wiseman, 2008) despite the fact that such arrangements may lead
to the creation of different schemes that must be harmonized over
time (Mills, 2007). The lessons from Cambodia indicate that, in this
process, a number of critical factors emerge: the need to expand the
ﬁscal space for health care; a commitment to equity; speciﬁc mea-
sures to protect the poor; building national capacity for SHP and UC
administration; and working within the speciﬁc national context.
The limitations of our study relatemainly to the small number of
key informants, the lack of opportunity to canvass views from other
stakeholders and communities, and the limited resources available
for the research. The research was informed by the long-term
involvement in research and policy advice in Cambodia by three
of the authors, providing useful insights to the process. To reduce
the subjectivity of the researchers, which is inherent in such an
approach, we consulted widely with a range of stakeholders about
our ﬁndings. By seeking to integrate the largely donor-funded HEFs
into a broader social health protection system for the informal
sector, the MOH has responded to the accepted need for strong
national ownership of the SHP process and a strong role for gov-
ernment. Cambodia shows that an important part of the process is
the transfer of responsibilities from development partners to gov-
ernment administration, using prepayment, risk pooling and sub-
sidy mechanisms to create a uniform national structure. The way in
which Cambodia faces these challenges and opportunities will be
instructive to other lesser-developed countries.
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